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DIRECT TUITION PAYMENTS UNDER THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
ACT:
EQUAL REMEDIES FOR EQUAL HARM
KATIE HARRISON*
INTRODUCTION
Anna and Billy are eight year-old third graders attending public school in
New York City.1 At the beginning of their third grade years in 2008,
Anna's and Billy's teachers suspected that each child was suffering from
learning disabilities. Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Improvement Education Act (IDEA), which aims "to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education [(FAPE)],"2 each student was evaluated by a special education
teacher, and each was identified as having learning disabilities. 3 Each
school then drafted an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the
students for the 2008-2009 school year,4 which provided for three hours of
weekly individual tutoring for each child.
At the conclusion of the students' third grade years, each school
evaluated the students again and proposed new IEPs for the 2009-2010
* J.D., St. John's University School of Law (2011); B.A., Middlebury College (2006). This article
would not have been possible without the assistance and support of Joseph Kohn, the guidance of
Professor Rosemary Salomone, and the fantastic editing of the Journal of Civil Rights and Economic
Development staff. Thank you all!
1 Anna and Billy are hypothesized characters that reflect the situations of many disabled children
and their families in the public education system. These characters are not modeled off of any specific
case.
2 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2011).
3 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A)(201 1) (requiring a local educational agency (LEA) to "conduct a
full individual initial evaluation . .. before the initial provision of special education and related services
to a child with a disability"); 20 U.S.C §1401(3)(A)(201 1) (defining "child with disability").
4 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(201 1) (describing the required elements of an IEP and the manner in
which it is developed).
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school year.5 The new IEPs provided the same services as the prior year.
Neither Anna's nor Billy's parents were satisfied with these proposed IEPs,
because neither believed their child was benefiting from the services. Both
parents met with the special education teacher and school administrators
during the summer of 2009 to alter the 2009-2010 IEP,6 but since neither
school thought that changes were necessary, no changes were made.
Pursuant to the IDEA, if the parents of a disabled child believe the public
school has failed to provide their child with a FAPE, as both Anna's and
Billy's parents believed, the parents have two possible remedies. First, the
parents can leave the child in his current placement and bring a due process
complaint against the school district seeking changes to the student's IEP7
and compensatory services.8 Alternatively, the parents can withdraw their
child from the public school, place him in private school, and then file a
due process complaint seeking reimbursement for the payment of the
private school tuition ("unilateral placement"). 9 Anna's and Billy's parents
are convinced that their child will not receive an appropriate education
during the 2009-2010 school year, so they each opt for the latter remedy
and place their child in a private school that provides special education
services.
Anna's parents place her at Academy A. They sign an enrollment
contract and pay the school's $50,000 tuition in advance of the school
year.o They then file a due process complaint seeking reimbursement of
the private school tuition. Billy's parents want to place him at Academy B,
which also has a tuition of $50,000, but Billy's parents cannot afford to pay
any of the school's tuition. Academy B reviews Billy's school records and
his 2009-2010 JEP, and concludes that he has been denied an appropriate
5 Public schools are required to evaluate and revisit IEPs annually. See id.
6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (2011) (allowing parents to be included in the child's IEP team).
7 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (201 )(providing "[a]n opportunity for any party to present a
complaint with respect to any matter relating to . .. the provision of a [FAPE]").
8 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[a]n award of
compensatory education is an equitable remedy that a court can grant" pursuant to the appropriate relief
provision codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)); see Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464
F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that "[c]ompensatory education services can be awarded as
appropriate equitable relief' when a disabled child has been denied a FAPE).
9 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(10)(C)(201 1). There are certain notice requirements parents must follow as
well. See 20 U.S.C § 1415(c)(1). These procedural requirements are important when a court determines
whether the parents' unilateral placement was proper. If the court finds that a parent has not fully
complied with the IDEA or cooperated with the school district in developing an appropriate IEP, the
court will deny relief to the parents. Equitable considerations are also relevant in fashioning relief. See
Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985).
10 $50,000 is representative of tuition for a private school specializing in children with disabilities
in the New York City metropolitan area. See, e.g., Winston Prep Application, available at ftp://louie.
winstonprep.edu/FTPfiles/WPSapp.pdf.
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education by the public school and that Academy B can provide Billy with
an appropriate education. Thus, Academy B agrees to enroll Billy for the
2009-2010 school year. Academy B requires Billy's parents to sign a
contract that obliges them to seek tuition reimbursement from the public
school and holds them responsible for the school's $50,000 tuition
regardless of the result of the administrative hearing process. Billy's
parents file a timely due process complaint seeking payment of the private
school tuition.
Anna's and Billy's cases proceed slowly through the administrative
hearing process. The independent hearing officers (IHO) in each case do
not render decisions until March 2010.11 Both IHOs find that the public
schools failed to provide an appropriate education to Anna and Billy, that
the children were properly placed in private school, and that their parents
complied with all aspects of the IDEA.12 Consequently, the IHOs find that
each public school is responsible for reimbursing the parents for the private
school tuition under the IDEA's reimbursement provision.13 The IHO
directs the public school to reimburse Anna's parents for the costs they
have expended. The IHO in Billy's case also directs the public school to
reimburse Billy's parents for the costs they have expended or debts they
have incurred. However, because Billy's parents could not afford to make
any payments, they have not expended any money. The IHO finds that the
contract between Billy's parents and Academy B did not create a financial
II The IDEA provides timing requirements for the administrative review process. See 20 U.S.C. §
1415(c). After filing a complaint regarding an IEP, the school district has 10 days to provide the parent
with an explanation of the IEP. See § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I). Then, the parent has 15 days after receiving
that explanation to notify the LEA that she is requesting an independent hearing. See § 1415(c)(2)(C).
Subsequent to filing the complaint with the IHO, within 5 days, the IHO must determine whether the
complaint meets the requirements of § 1415. See § 1415(c)(2)(D). The parties then must attend a pre-
trial meeting within 15 days of the IHO's certification of the matter. See § 1415(f)(1)(B)(I)(i). The
hearing must occur within 30 days of that conference, and a final decision by the IHO must be rendered
within 45 days of that hearing. See § 1415(f)(1)(B)(1)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a)-(b). The IDEA
provides for a maximum of 120 days to elapse between the parent's filing of the initial complaint to the
school district and a final determination on the merits by an IHO. See § 1415. Additionally, the IDEA
provides for an expedited hearing process to appeal a decision to change a child's placement during the
school year. See § 1415(k)(4). An expedited hearing must occur within 20 days after a hearing is
requested, and a final decision by an IHO must be rendered within 10 days of that hearing. See §
1415(k)(4)(B). However, the process does not always proceed or conclude in the timely manner
envisioned by the Act. For instance, Forest Grove School District v. TA., 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009)
"vividly demonstrates the problem of delay, as respondent's parents first sought a due process hearing
in April 2003, and the District Court issued its decision in May 2005." Likewise, in Wilkins v. D.C., 571
F. Supp. 2d 163, 171-72 (D.D.C. 2008), a final determination was not issued until 5 months after an
expedited hearing.
12 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. These requirements are referred to as "Burlington's three
prongs."
13 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (stating the "court or hearing officer may require the agency
to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment..").
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obligation because neither the school nor Billy's parents intended to be
bound by the contract. The IHO therefore finds that the public school does
not have to make any payments to Billy's parents or to Academy B. Thus,
Academy B does not receive any compensation for educating Billy for the
2009-2010 school year.
In the summer of 2010, the public school again tries to formulate a
proper IEP for Billy. Nevertheless, Billy's parents believe that the IEP for
the 2010-2011 school year is still inappropriate. Consequently, Billy's
parents would like to re-enroll him at Academy B. However, Academy B
refuses to consider him for admission because the Academy does not think
that Billy's parents will receive payment of tuition if they succeed on the
merits of Billy's case. As a result, Billy must return to public school for
the 2010-2011 school year, where he will receive an inappropriate
education for some, if not all, of the school year.14 Additionally, Betsy,
another disabled child from a low-income family, applies to Academy B
during the summer of 2010 because her parents believe she has been denied
a FAPE in her public school. Academy B agrees that Betsy has been
denied a FAPE, but denies her application for admission because her
parents cannot afford to pay its tuition. Academy B now knows, based on
its experience with Billy, that it is not likely to receive tuition from the
public school even if Betsy's parents prevail at the administrative hearing.
Hence, like Billy, Betsy will be denied a FAPE for all or most of her 20 10-
2011 school year.
This Note analyzes whether payment of private school tuition under the
IDEA is available to parents that unilaterally place their children in private
school but do not pay the private school tuition because of a financial
inability to do so. To receive relief for a unilateral placement under the
IDEA's reimbursement provision, a parent must prove that such relief is
warranted. The IDEA does not define reimbursement, and the Supreme
Court has never clarified its use of the term. As recently demonstrated in
several decisions by New York's State Review Office (SRO), the scope of
the reimbursement provision is unsettled.15 Local educational agencies
14 Upon Academy B's denial of admission, Billy's parents can seek a revision of his IEP through
the administrative process. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). If the judge or IHO finds that the IEP is
inappropriate, she will instruct the public school to provide appropriate services. However, because of
the delay in the administrative process, a decision declaring the IEP inappropriate may not be rendered
until many months into the school year. As a result, Billy will be forced to forgo an appropriate
education for those intervening months. Billy's parents can also seek compensatory services for the
school's failure to provide a FAPE during that time. However, these services will likely not provide
Billy with an appropriate education for the majority of the 2010-2011 school year.
15 See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, No. 09-104, at 10 (N.Y. State Review
Office, November 25, 2009), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-104.pdf (
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(LEAs) advocate for a narrow reading of the provision, limited only to the
plain meaning of "repayment,"' 6 "to pay back," or "to make restoration."' 7
Parents urge that both Congress and the Supreme Court intended
"reimbursement" to have a broader meaning, encompassing prospective
relief in the form of direct tuition payments.1 8 As discussed below,
Supreme Court precedent, the IDEA's purposes, and principles of justice
support the latter view that Congress did not intend to foreclose the remedy
of unilateral placement to low-income disabled children. Consequently this
Note proposes two solutions to this controversy. First, Congress should
amend the reimbursement provision to capture the remedy of unilateral
placement as Congress intended. Second, courts and IHOs should award
tuition payments to parents that have not incurred a financial obligation to a
private school under the appropriate relief provision.
Part I of this Note discusses the legislative and judicial development of
unilateral placement and the remedies available under the IDEA for that
placement. Part II evaluates the arguments for awarding tuition payments
to low-income parents under the reimbursement and appropriate relief
stating, "[t]he evidence contained in the hearing record establishes that the parent has neither paid any
tuition nor incurred any out-of-pocket expenses in connection with the student's 2008-2009 school year.
. . . There is no evidence . . . indicating that the [private school] has ever sought payment of the
student's tuition for the 2008-09 school year from the parent or the student's grandmother, or that is has
any intention of doing so. Consequently, . . . I disagree with the impartial hearing officer's conclusion
that the parent has standing to seek tuition reimbursement."); Application of a Student with a Disability,
No. 09-079, at 11 (N.Y. State Review Office, September 14, 2009), available at http://www.sro.nysed
.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-079.pdf (stating, "[b]ecause the hearing record demonstrates that the parent
has not paid any tuition or incurred out-of-pocket expenses, under the circumstances of the instant
appeal, I concur with the impartial hearing officer's conclusion that the parent does not have standing to
seek tuition reimbursement or retrospective relief on behalf of the private placement."); Application of a
Student with a Disability, No. 08-50, at 9 (N.Y. State Review Office, July 23, 2008), available at
http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-050.pdf (stating, "[r]eimbursement under the IDEA
allows parents to recover only actual, not anticipated expenses, for private school tuition and related
expenses."); Application of the N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 07-032, at 5-6 (N.Y. State Review
Office, July 5, 2007), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2007/07-032.pdf (finding
"no support for [the parent's] assertion ... that she incurred financial responsibility for the student
tuition" although the parent and school had signed a contract for the full tuition).
16 Reimbursement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
17 Reimbursement, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2010), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/reimbursement.
18 See, e.g., Mr. A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 09 Civ. 5097 (PGG), 2011 WL 321137
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 1, 2011) (holding that a narrow reading of reimbursement is "entirely antithetical to
Congress's clearly expressed legislative intent and purpose in enacting the IDEA"); Connors v. Mills,
34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 803 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (agreeing with a parent's argument that pre-payment of
tuition is not required and that prospective payments are available under the IDEA where the parent
"has shown the Burlington prerequisites [because her] right to payment for placing [her child] in the
[private] school has attached"); Lewis M. Wasserman, Reimbursement to Parents of Tuition and Other
Costs Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN'S J.L.
CoMM. 171, 235-36 (2006) ("IDEA/2004, after all, only addresses the reimbursement remedy for
private placements not prospective payment obligations, unless pendency rights are involved.")
(internal formatting omitted).
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provisions. Part III argues that amending the reimbursement provision to
enable low-income parents to receive private school tuition payments when
they have properly placed their child in private school reflects
Congressional intent and fulfills the purpose of the IDEA. Part IV
proposes that courts and IHOs currently addressing remedies available to
low-income parents after a proper unilateral placement should award
tuition payments to those parents under the IDEA's appropriate relief
provision.
I. UNILATERAL PLACEMENT UNDER THE IDEA
The struggle of disabled individuals to receive educational services and
support from states and localities has been advanced by Congress and the
United States Supreme Court over the past forty years. Prior to 1975,
disabled children were almost "totally excluded from [public] schools."19
The landmark cases of Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Pennsylvania20 and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of
Columbia21 influenced Congress to mandate rules for educating disabled
students in public school. 22 In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA),23 which required that public
schools provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to all disabled
students. 24 Although the EAHCA has been amended three times since its
19 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975)).
20 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (approving a consent decree which declared that "all
mentally retarded persons are capable of benefiting from a program of education and training" and,
"[h]aving undertaken to provide a free public education to all of its children, including its exceptional
children, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded child access to a free
public program of education and training").
21 348 F. Supp. 866, 874 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's due process clause
requires that "the [District of Columbia] Board of Education ... provide whatever specialized
instruction [] will benefit the [city's disabled] child[ren]").
22 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary's Now-Limited Role in Special Education, in FROM
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 121, 121 (Joshua
M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., Brookings Institution Press 2009) (explaining that Congress enacted
federal legislation to address the issues raised in PARC and Mills as well as constitutional litigation in
twenty-eight states); see also MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAw 693 (4th ed.,
Wadsworth Cengage Learning 2002) (discussing PARC and Mills and stating that the EAHCA
"codifie[d] [those cases] in several respects").
23 See Pub. L. 94-142; see also U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, HISTORY:
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN PROGRESS OF EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 1-2
(2000) (hereinafter TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN PROGRESS); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO
SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS 25 (2000).
24 See Pub. L. 94-142 Sec. 3(c) (declaring that "[i]t is the purpose of this Act to assure that all
handicapped children have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education"); Sec. 4(a)(1 8)
(defining FAPE as "special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in
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enactment, this foundational FAPE requirement remains unchanged in the
current version, now called the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act (IDEA).25 To provide a disabled child with a FAPE, a
school district must offer special education and related services that meet
four requirements: the education and services must (i) be provided at public
expense; (ii) meet state educational standards; (iii) be appropriate; and (iv)
conform to an individualized education program (IEP).26
As discussed above, when a child has been denied a FAPE, the IDEA
provides parents with procedural and substantive remedies for that denial. 27
When the IDEA was enacted in 1975 (as the EAHCA), a court could award
"such relief as [it] determines appropriate" if a child was denied a FAPE
("appropriate relief provision").28 The Supreme Court, in School
Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts,
interpreted this provision as allowing courts to award reimbursement of
private school tuition to the parent when the parent unilaterally placed her
child in private school, as long as that placement was proper.29 Unilateral
placement occurs when a parent of a disabled child removes the child from
the public school, without agreement or approval from the public school,
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program").
25 The EACHA was first amended in 1990 and the Act's name was changed to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). See Pub. L. 94-142, Title IX, Sec. 901(a)(1); LAURA ROTHSTEIN &
SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 11. The IDEA was amended in 1997, see Pub. L. 105-
17, and again in 2004, see Pub. L. 108-446. See also TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN PROGRESS, supra note 23,
at 3.
26 These requirements come from 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006), which outlines the requirements for
"[fjree appropriate public education." The Supreme Court has held that "appropriate public education"
means only "specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide
educational benefit to the handicapped child." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982). The
Court did not require schools to "maximize the potential of handicapped children commensurate with
the opportunity provided to other children." Id. at 189-90 (internal quotations omitted).
27 To take advantage of these remedies, parents must initiate an administrative appeals process.
See, e.g., Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 361-64 (1985). The Court in that
case stated that "[i]n several places, the [IDEA] emphasizes the participation of the parents in
developing the child's educational program and assessing its effectiveness." Id. at 368. According to
Valerie Leiter and Marty Wyngaarden Krauss, who discuss the role parents can play in securing
services for their disabled child, although the IDEA generally gives parents considerable power to
secure services for their disabled child, those parents must also be aware of the power they have in
order to take advantage of all that the IDEA affords them. Claims, Barriers, and Satisfaction: Parents'
Requests for Additional Special Education Services, 15 J. DISABILITIES POL. STUD. 135, 136 (2004).
Often, low- and middle-income parents do not take advantage of the IDEA because they are unaware of
the power the IDEA gives them. See id. at 136-37. This can result from a lack of time or education, or
an inability to understand the IDEA's complex legal structure. See id.
28 The section of IDEA which gives the court this power is § 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
29 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (observing that when a court found a private placement was
proper, the court could issue an injunction compelling officials to establish and pay for an IEP,
involving placement of the child in private school); see also James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d
804, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that "a school district must reimburse parents for a child's unilateral
placement in a private program if the court determines (1) that the private placement desired by
Plaintiffs was proper and (2) that the school district's proposed JEP was inappropriate").
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and then places the child in a private school where he receives special
education services. 30 In order to receive payment of tuition for the
unilateral placement, a parent must prove at the administrative hearing 31
that (i) the child was not receiving a FAPE in public school because her
IEP was inappropriate; 32 (ii) the child's private school placement was
appropriate; and (iii) any equitable considerations support granting relief to
the parent. 33
In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA and added reimbursement as a
separate remedy for a parent to seek when she has unilaterally placed her
child in private school. 34 Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) of the IDEA provides
that a local education agency (LEA) is not required "to pay for the cost of
education ... of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if
that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child
and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or
facility." 35 Subsection (ii) provides that:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received
special education and related services under the authority of a public
30 See ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 200 (defining "unilateral placement"); see also
CALLEGARY & STEEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING SPECIAL EDUCATION AND ADVOCATING FOR YOUR
CHILD 4, available at http://www.mansef.org/assets/pdfs/Advocatingfor Your Child.pdf (last visited
Feb. 11, 2011) (explaining that a "unilateral placement" occurs when parents decide to place their child
in a private school without approval from the "IEP team, and then ask the public school system to
reimburse them for the cost").
31 In Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57-58 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in a
special education administrative appeal bears the burden of proof. When Schaffer was decided, several
states already had statutes assigning the burden of proof to the school districts; since the Schaffer
decision, several more have enacted these statutes. See Lara Gelbwasser Freed, Cooperative Federalism
Post-Schaffer: The Burden of Proof and Preemption in Special Education, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
103, 125 (2009). For example New York's Education Law places the burden of proving that the public
school's IEP was appropriate on the public school and the burden of proving that the private school
placement was appropriate on the parents, regardless of which party brings the appeal. See N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 4404(l)(c) (Consol. 2007).
32 In Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982), the Supreme Court held that an
"appropriate" education means that the child is able to get "some educational benefit" from her IEP. See
also, supra note 26 and accompanying text, which analyzes the Rowley definition of the term
"appropriate."
33 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370, 374 (stating that where the desired private placement was
proper and the public school placement was inappropriate, the court would issue an injunction to affect
relief that is "appropriate," and additionally noting that a grant of "appropriate" relief "means that
equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief'); see also Bettinger v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86116, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007) (describing what the court refers to
as "Burlington's [t]hree-[plrong [t]est" as "(1) whether the services offered by the board of education
were inadequate or inappropriate, (2) whether the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and
(3) whether equitable considerations support the parents' claim for reimbursement").
34 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2006) (codifying the reimbursement provision); see also
William H. Hurd & Stephen C. Piepgrass, Special Education Law, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 17, 49 (2009)
(explaining the development of the reimbursement remedy under the IDEA).
35 § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).
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agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary
school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court
or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents
for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that
the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available
to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. 36
Since the enactment of the reimbursement provision in 1997, parents
have almost exclusively sought payment of private school tuition under that
provision, even though the appropriate relief provision remains in the
IDEA.37
II. REIMBURSEMENT: THE CURRENT REMEDY FOR UNILATERAL
PLACEMENT AND WHY IT DOESN'T WORK FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES
As set forth in Part I, the IDEA recognizes a parent's right to unilaterally
place her disabled child in a private school when the local education
agency (LEA) fails to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE)
to the child. Before the enactment of the reimbursement provision in 1997,
the only remedy for that failure was appropriate relief, which the Supreme
Court held included the payment of private school tuition after success on
the merits of the case. 38 Appropriate relief remains a remedy for unilateral
placement. 39 However, since 1997, parents that have unilaterally placed
their child in private school have sought to remedy the LEA's failure to
provide a FAPE largely through the reimbursement provision.40
36 § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
37 See, e.g., ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. & CHARLES J. Russo, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A
GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 173 (2d ed. Corwin Press 2006) (discussing remedies for an LEA's failure
to provide a FAPE and indicating that reimbursement alone is available after a unilateral placement).
But see Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009) (holding that reimbursement is
available under the appropriate relief provision if the reimbursement provision does not apply to the
circumstances of the case).
38 See, e.g., Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; see also Timothy M. Huskey, Teaching the Children
"Appropriately:" Publicly Financed Private Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 60 Mo. L. REv. 167, 176 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court holding that retroactive
reimbursement was appropriate relief in the proper case).
39 See, e.g., Forest Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 2484, 2486, 2493; see also Natalie Pyong Kocher, Lost in
Forest Grove: Interpreting IDEA's Inherent Paradox, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 333, 336 (2010)
(stating that the IDEA empowers courts with broad discretion to grant appropriate relief).
40 See OSBORNE & RusSo, supra note 37; see also Michael J. Tentindo, Private School Tuition at
the Public's Expense: A Disabled Student's Right To a Free Appropriate Public Education, 17 AM. U.J.
GENDER SoC. POL'Y & L. 81, 85 (2009) (discussing the 1997 Amendment and a parent's right to obtain
a tuition reimbursement).
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A. Establishing Standing Under the IDEA
Parents seeking relief under the IDEA must first establish that they have
standing to seek relief under the IDEA. To have standing under the IDEA,
a parent must demonstrate that (i) she or her child has suffered an injury;
(ii) the LEA caused that injury; and (iii) a favorable decision by the judge
or IHO will redress that injury.41 Some courts have held that a parent does
not have standing to sue under the IDEA where she has not paid out-of-
pocket expenses to a private school or incurred a financial obligation to pay
that tuition, and therefore has not suffered an injury. 42 Alternatively, a
parent can establish standing by demonstrating an injury to her child.
Denial of a FAPE by the public school constitutes an injury in fact under
the IDEA.43 Payment of the private school's tuition redresses the injury to
the child, as it satisfies the school's obligation to provide the student with
an appropriate education "at public expense," a basic requirement of a
FAPE.44
B. The Scope of the Reimbursement Provision
Once a parent establishes standing to sue under the IDEA, she can seek
to redress her injuries through the remedies provided by the IDEA. The
IDEA currently provides for "relief that a court determines is
appropriate" 45 or for "reimburse[ment] to parents for the cost of [private
41 See, e.g., S.W. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (listing
the requirements for standing under the IDEA); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992) (stating the standing requirements under Article 3, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution).
42 See, e.g., Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Dist., 432 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that
disabled child's parent lacked standing because he had not suffered an injury in fact since his insurance
company had paid the tuition and the parent had not paid any out of pocket expenses for his son's
tuition at private school); Piedmont Behavior Health Center, LLC v. Stewart, 413 F. Supp. 2d 746, 754-
55 (S.D.W. Va. 2006) (holding that a disabled child's parent did not have standing under the IDEA
because she had not suffered an injury since she was only suing for the school district's failure to pay
for the child's private school education); see Application of a Student with a Disability, No. 09-104,
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
43 In Winkelman v. Parma City School District, the Supreme Court held that parents can prosecute
IDEA claims where their child has been denied rights under the IDEA because the IDEA gives parents
enforceable rights which encompass the entitlement to a FAPE for the parent's child. 550 U.S. 516, 526
(2007). Although the issue in Winkelman was not presented in the context of standing, the outcome
demonstrates that the parents are entitled to bring cases solely where their child has been denied a
FAPE. In S. W, the court found that the parent of a disabled child did not have standing based on an
indebtedness to the private school, but that the parent did have standing to sue on behalf of her child
because "[t]he denial of a FAPE or of a procedural right created by the IDEA [] constitutes an injury
sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement." 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
44 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A) (2011); S.W, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 358-59 (holding that "[t]he IDEA
requires school districts to provide disabled children with a FAPE, which is defined by the statute, in
relevant part, as 'special education and related services that ... have been provided at public expense . .
45 § 1415(i)(2).
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school] enrollment." 46 Since the Supreme Court first addressed unilateral
placement, this remedy has been labeled as "reimbursement." 47 The Court
defined the relief as reimbursement in situations where parents had paid
private school tuition in advance and were seeking repayment of the costs
they expended.48 However, the Court's award of appropriate relief did not
depend on the parent's advance payment of tuition. Instead, that relief was
based on the authority of the appropriate relief provision, the purpose of the
IDEA, and the injustice that would result if tuition payments were not
awarded. 49 As discussed below, this rationale requires that the remedy of
direct tuition payments be available to all parents under the IDEA.
The reimbursement provision codified an important legal remedy for
parents and disabled children under the IDEA. Reimbursement redresses a
parent's injury - whether payment of out-of-pocket expenses or assumption
of a financial obligation - by requiring repayment of those expenses or
satisfaction of the debt by the local educational agency (LEA).50
Reimbursement also redresses the injury to the child - denial of a FAPE -
because it satisfies the LEA's obligation to provide a student with an
appropriate education "at public expense." 51
Prior to 1997, reimbursement was awarded as appropriate relief.
However, with the addition of the reimbursement provision, Congress
provided a specific remedy for unilateral placements. 52 In 2009, however,
the Supreme Court clarified that the reimbursement provision was not the
sole provision under which courts and IHOs could award private school
46 § 1412(a)(10)(C).
47 See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985) (framing one of the
issues facing the Court as "whether the potential relief available under [the appropriate relief provision]
includes reimbursement to parents for private school tuition and related expenses") (emphasis added);
see also Rouse v. Wilson, 675 F. Supp. 1012, 1014-18 (W.D. Va. 1987) (examining the Burlington
decision, and concluding "§ 1415(e)(3) does not pertain to financial responsibilities").
48 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 362 (describing the situation to be addressed as one in which the parent
"enrolled [his son] in the Carroll School in mid-August at his own expense") (emphasis added); Rouse,
675 F. Supp. at 1019 (explaining that a parent "'would be barred from obtaining reimbursement' for
tuition expenses [if a school] offered a free and appropriate education which the parent unilaterally
rejected").
49 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369 (finding that the "broad discretion" conferred on courts by the
appropriate relief provision enables courts to fashion relief "in light of the purpose of the Act," which is
to "provide handicapped children with a [FAPE]"); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484,
2490-91 (2009) (stating that public funds would even be used if necessary).
50 § 1412(a)(10)(C); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60-61 (2005) (discussing how all parents have
the right to an independent educational evaluation).
51 § 1401(9)(A); Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 949-50 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining an LEA's
obligation of providing a free education).
52 § 1412(a)(10)(C); Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1993)
(discussing the possibility of obtaining reimbursement after unilateral placements).
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tuition.53 In Forest Grove v. TA., the Court held that since the
reimbursement provision requires that a disabled child "previously
receive[] special education and related services under the authority of a
public agency" before reimbursement can be awarded, in a situation where
the disabled child never received special education services in public
school before he was unilaterally placed in private school, the
reimbursement provision did not apply.54 Since T.A. had never received
such services, the Court held that the child was not eligible for
reimbursement under the reimbursement provision. 55 Instead, the Court
held that upon a showing of Burlington's three prongs, 56 tuition
reimbursement was still appropriate relief.57
The Forest Grove rationale can justify an award of tuition payments in a
situation like Billy's because it similarly falls outside the parameters of the
reimbursement provision. Billy's parents are not able to seek
reimbursement as envisioned by that provision because of their financial
status. Instead, Billy's parents are seeking direct payment of tuition, a
remedy that a court or IHO has the discretion to award under the
appropriate relief provision.58
This argument, however, ignores the fact that Congress intended the
reimbursement provision to provide a remedy for unilateral placement, as
long as the child received special education and related services in public
school before his enrollment in private school. 59 Billy fits in that intended
class, as he previously received special education and related services in
53 Forest Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 2493 (awarding private school tuition payments to the parents under
the appropriate relief provision instead of the reimbursement provision); see generally Frank G. v. Bd.
of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the possibility of receiving a free education under the
appropriate relief provisions).
54 See Forest Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 2493 (holding that the reimbursement provision "does not
foreclose reimbursement awards in other circumstances").
55 Id (finding that the reimbursement provision is "best read as elucidative rather than exhaustive"
and granting relief under the appropriate relief provision because T.A. did not fall within the
"elucidative" list of § 1412(a)(10)(C)).
56 Id. at 2496. The Court found that TA's parents successfully proved the first two prongs, but that
the district court failed to "consider the equities" as required by Burlington's third prong. Id. The Court
remanded the case for that determination. Id.
57 Id. at 2494, n.10 (noting that denying reimbursement in to TA's parents would be an
"injustice").
58 See infra discussion in Part IV; see also, Mr. A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 09 Civ.
5097 (PGG), 2011 WL 321137 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 1, 2011) (holding that the appropriate relief provision is
"sufficiently broad to encompass the retroactive direct tuition payment"); Connors v. Mills, 34 F. Supp.
2d 795, 802 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (ruling that the holdings of Burlington and Carter "establish the validity"
of prospective relief for placement in private school under the IDEA's appropriate relief provision).
59 See ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 200 (explaining the circumstances in which the
remedy of reimbursement is available); see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S.
359, 370 (1985) (describing that the third grade student was in an IEP, which called for individualized
tutoring by a reading specialist, before the parents unilaterally place him in a private school).
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public school, his parents enrolled him in a private school without the
consent of the LEA, and the LEA failed to provide Billy with a FAPE
prior to that enrollment. 60 Consequently, the reimbursement provision
should apply to Billy's situation.61 Furthermore, since the reimbursement
provision's enactment, courts and IHOs have applied that provision in
situations like Billy's. In such cases, parents generally needed only to
successfully demonstrate Burlington's three prongs to secure payment of
their child's private school tuition.
Recently, however, New York independent hearing officers (IHOs) and
the New York State Review Office (SRO)62 have denied claims for tuition
payments, even after parents have succeeded on the merits of their case,
because the parent has not paid out-of-pocket expenses or incurred a
financial obligation.63 In these cases, the parents did not pay tuition
because they could not afford to.64 These decisions reason that these
parents could not have intended to pay the tuition, and therefore, did not
enter into a valid contract to pay that tuition.65 According to this rationale,
these parents have not incurred a debt and are not entitled to
reimbursement. These decisions limit the scope of the reimbursement
60 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2011) (listing the requirements for reimbursement for
private school placements).
61 But see infra Part IV (proposing that in light of the extreme inequities produced by the current
reimbursement provision, direct tuition payments are available under the appropriate relief provision
until an amendment is passed incorporating direct tuition payments into the reimbursement provision).
62 New York has a two-tier administrative decision process. See Mary A. Lunch, Who Should Hear
The Voices Of Children With Disabilities: Proposed Changes In Due Process In New York's Special
Education System, 55 ALB. L. REV. 179, 182 (1991). Some states only have a one-tier system. After
review at the final administrative level, parties can appeal to federal or state court. See Perry Zirkel, The
Remedial Authority Of Hearing And Review Officers Under The Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 401, 402 (2006).
63 See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, No. 08-50, at 9-10 (N.Y. State Review
Office, July 23, 2008), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-050.pdf (finding
that neither the parent nor the private school had standing to sue for reimbursement of past tuition
because the parent never paid out-of-pocket expenses and the IDEA only allows parents, and not private
schools, to seek reimbursement from the public school district); see also Muller v. Comm. on Special
Educ. of East Islip, 145 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that compensation for a parent's out-of-
pocket expenses is appropriate).
64 The SRO decisions denying tuition payments do not explicitly state that the parents failed to pay
tuition because of a financial inability. However, in each decision in which the SRO employs this
rationale, the parents are represented by a non-profit organization such as Advocates for Children or
Partnership for Children's Rights, groups which only represent low-income or no-income parents.
Coupled with the fact that these parents made no payments to the private school before the
administrative decision was rendered, concluding that these parents are low-income is a fair
assumption.
65 See, e.g., Application of the N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 07-032 at 5-6 (N.Y. State Review
Office, July 5, 2007), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2007/07-032.pdf (reviewing
an enrollment contract where the parties contracted for the full tuition and finding that the parent's
failure to pay any part of that tuition indicated that the contract was not valid); see also Daz-Fonseca v.
Commonwealth of P. R., 451 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that tuition reimbursements are not for
anticipated expenses).
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provision and circumvent Congress's intention in enacting that provision.
C. Demonstrating a Need for Reimbursement
Under the current statutory scheme, low-income parents that cannot
afford to pay out-of-pocket expenses for private school tuition must enter
into an enrollment contract with the private school. Parents generally sign
one of three types of enrollment contracts. One type requires that the
parent only seek reimbursement under the IDEA and cooperate with the
private school's attorneys during that process ("Agreement to
Cooperate"). 66 A second type of contract obligates the parent to pay the
school's full tuition ("Agreement to Pay"). 67 The third type combines the
first two, and the parent agrees to seek reimbursement under the IDEA and
cooperate with the school's attorneys, and, in the event that tuition
payments are denied, to pay the tuition in full ("Agreement to Cooperate
and Pay"). 68
Under the reimbursement provision, if the enrollment contract is deemed
valid by the court or IHO, payment of tuition is awarded. Courts and IHOs
evaluate enrollment contracts pursuant to the governing state's contract
law.69 Although some variation exists among the states, most state contract
66 See e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, No. 08-50, at 10 (N.Y. State Review Office,
July 23, 2008), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-050.pdf (finding that the
agreement between the parent and the private school required the parent to seek tuition reimbursement
under the IDEA).
67 See, e.g., Application of the N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 07-032, at 5-6 (N.Y. State Review
Office, July 5, 2007), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2007/07-032.pdf (reviewing
an enrollment contract where the parties contracted for the full tuition).
68 In Application of a Student with a Disability v. N.Y State Review Office, at issue was an
Agreement to Cooperate and Pay. The enrollment contract obliged the parent and grandparent "to seek
funding from the district and to cooperate fully with . . . their counsel and the [private school] . . . [and
if they] are denied payment by a final unappealed decision resolving their claim for prospective
payment of tuition, they will remain responsible for tuition costs per the Enrollment Agreement and will
complete a new payment schedule." Appeal No. 09-104, at 9-10 (N.Y. State Review Office, November
24, 2009), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-104.pdf.
69 See, e.g., 5-24 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.6. Some states view contracts purely objectively,
interpreting a contract from the view of a reasonable third person. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City
Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (holding that "[a] contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do
with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere
force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a
known intent."), aff'd sub nom; Ernst v. Mechanics' & Metals Nat. Bank of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir.
1912), aff'd sub nom; Nat. City Bank of N.Y. v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). Other states use a
combined objective-subjective approach similar to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. This
approach attempts to ascertain each party's intent in entering into the contract by viewing each party as
a reasonable person who is subject to circumstances existing at the time of contracting. A final tool of
contract interpretation is a fully subjective approach. Many courts have discounted this theory of
interpretation because of the difficulty of "delv[ing] into the parties' minds to ascertain their original
intent." Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980).
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law requires that contracts be evaluated objectively. 70 Under the objective
theory of contracts, "the object in construing a contract is to ascertain the
meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in the language used, and to
give effect to that intent so long as it does not conflict with any rule of law,
good morals, or public policy."71 Where the language used is "plain,
complete, and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be gathered
from that language, and from that language alone, regardless of what the
actual or secret intentions of the parties may have been." 72 In that instance,
the judge or IHO will enforce the plain meaning of the contractual
language without "inquir[ing] into the actual mental processes of the
parties in entering into the particular contract." 73
Courts and IHOs applying the objective approach to contract
interpretation should find that each type of agreement (Agreement to
Cooperate, Agreement to Pay, and Agreement to Cooperate and Pay), if
unambiguous, is a valid contract regardless of the parents' ability to pay the
private school tuition. However, an Agreement to Cooperate, though valid,
does not financially obligate a parent to pay tuition; rather, it merely
requires them to seek tuition payments. 74
70 An alternative to the objective approach is the subjective approach, in which a court or IHO
seeks to ascertain the intent of the parties regardless of the contractual language. However, this
approach is rarely used because of the difficulty of "delv[ing] into the parties' minds to ascertain their
original intent." Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1009. In Mellon Bank, the court rejected the subjective
approach stating that "courts neither claim nor possess psychic power. Therefore, in order to interpret
contracts with some consistency, and in order to provide contracting parties with a legal framework
which provides a measure of predictability, the courts must eschew the ideal of ascertaining the parties'
subjective intent and instead bind parties by the objective manifestations of their intent." Id. See also
Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. at 50.
71 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed.) § 31:4 (footnotes omitted)). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION OF PROMISE OR AGREEMENT § 200, cmt. b (2009) (explaining that a
court will interpret a contract by looking to "the intention manifested by [the parties] rather than any
different undisclosed intention").
72 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §31:4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: WHOSE
MEANING PREVAILS at § 201 cmt. a (2009) (discussing that a court will look to the contractual
language's "generally prevailing meaning" to determine the intention of the parties).
73 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §31:4. If the contractual language is not "plain, complete, and
unambiguous," a judge "may also look to . . . the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and
enforce the contract pursuant to "the common meaning of the parties, not a meaning imposed on them
by the law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: WHOSE MEANING PREVAILS at § 201 cmt. c
(2009). In the case of a contract between a school and a low-income parent, the common meaning of the
parties will likely be to create a financial obligation to pay tuition. Review of subjective intent should
only be used when analysis of a contract's plain language is inconclusive. See 1 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 32:1.
74 In S. W. v. New York City Department of Education, 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
the court evaluated an Agreement to Cooperate between a low-income parent and the private school).
After finding the contract unambiguous, the court held that the contract "plainly relieved S.W. of the
responsibility for the cost of her son's tuition [because it] include[d] an acknowledgment by S.W. that
she 'is dependent upon receiving prospective payment from the [New York City Department of
Education (DOE)]' in order to make the payment of tuition." Id. The court, therefore, found that S.W.
had not incurred a financial obligation to pay the private school tuition and that reimbursement was not
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On the other hand, Agreements to Pay and Agreements to Cooperate and
Pay do purport to create a financial obligation.75 If these agreements are
validly entered into and are unambiguous, courts applying the objective
approach to contract interpretation should look only to the contractual
language to determine the meaning of the contract. Since the plain
meaning of these contracts creates a financial obligation to pay tuition, a
court or IHO should enforce that meaning and award reimbursement to the
parent where she has succeeded on the merits of her case. In New York,
however, recent decisions by the State Review Office (SRO), the body that
hears appeals of IHO decisions,76 have held that Agreements to Pay and
Agreements to Cooperate and Pay are invalid contracts and do not create a
financial obligation when they are entered into by low-income parents. 77
These decisions are based upon the view that when a parent fails to pay any
tuition before or throughout the school year because she cannot afford to,
the parties have indicated an intention that they are not to be bound by their
contract, 78 and therefore, no contract has been formed.79
Additionally, LEAs argue that "all of the parties' words, phrases,
expressions and acts should be viewed in light of the circumstances that
existed at [the] time [the contract was made], including the situation of the
parties, both individually and relative to one another, and the objectives
warranted. Id The S.W. court did find that S.W. had standing based upon the injury to her son, the
LEA's failure to provide him with a FAPE. Id. at 358.
75 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
76 See Lunch, supra note 62, at 182; see also Zirkel, supra note 62, at 402.
77 See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, No. 08-50, at 9 (N.Y. State Review Office,
July 23, 2008), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-050.pdf (stating
"[R]eimbursement under the IDEA allows parents to recover only actual, not anticipated expenses, for
private school tuition and related expenses."); Application of the N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 07-032,
at 5-6 (N.Y. State Review Office, July 5, 2007), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex
/2007/07-032.pdf (finding "no support for [the parent's] assertion . . . that she incurred financial
responsibility for the student tuition" although the parent and school had signed a contract for the full
tuition).
78 A brief Internet search for private school tuition payment schedules reveals that most schools
offer installment payment plans. However, payment both before and throughout the year is usually
required. See, e.g., Portersville Christian School, Tuition and Fee Schedule 2009-2010, available at
http://portersvillechristianschool.org/prospective/tuitionschedule09-10.pdf (providing four payment
plans, each requiring payment by August of the enrollment year); Morristown-Beard School,
Tuition/School Affordability, available at http://www.mobeard.org/mbs/affordability.php (offering three
payment plans, each of which requires some payment by July of the enrollment year).
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: INTENTION TO BE LEGALLY BOUND § 21,
Illustration 1 (explaining that where A pays B $300 for a $15 watch, both understanding that the
transaction is "frolic and banter," the contract is unenforceable despite the parties belief or intention that
they would be legally bound by their exchange.); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS:
REVOCATION BY COMMUNICATION FROM OFFEROR RECEIVED BY OFFEREE § 42 (stating that "an
offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation
of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract").
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they sought to attain."80 LEAs contend that consideration of "the situations
of the parties" includes consideration of the financial situation of the
parents, and that it necessarily follows from these circumstances that
neither party intended to be bound by their agreement, since fulfillment of
the contract by the parent would be impossible. 81 LEAs also assert that the
objective that these parties sought to attain was not to create a true financial
obligation on the part of the low-income parent, but instead to deceive a
third party (namely, the IHO) into believing that such an obligation
existed. 82 Because that objective does not reflect an intention to be bound
by the contract, LEAs argue (and New York's SRO has agreed) that these
contracts are invalid and that these parents are not entitled to relief under
the IDEA.83
Parents and their advocates counter that this line of reasoning is contrary
to established law. Under New York contract law, "[i]f a contract is
unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to the contract as written
and may not consider extrinsic evidence to alter or interpret its meaning." 84
Parents submit that a financial inability to pay tuition, and a failure to pay
any tuition prior to an administrative decision, is irrelevant to interpreting
an unambiguous contract, because the court should look to the parties'
80 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed.) § 3:5 (footnotes omitted).
81 Application of a Student with a Disability, No. 09-104, at 9-10 (N.Y. State Review Office,
November 24, 2009), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-104.pdf (outlining
the school district's argument that the applicants never intended to pay the school's tuition because the
parent never paid any amount of tuition while the child was enrolled).
82 See Marcus A. Winters & Jay P. Greene, Debunking a Special Education Myth: Don t Blame
Private Options for Rising Costs, 7 EDUC. NEXT 67,67 (2007) (describing allegations made by critics of
private school tuition reimbursement that parents are "clever" and "greedy needy").
83 In Application of a Student with a Disability, N.Y State Review Office, the New York State
Review Office (SRO) denied a parent and grandparent's application for private school funding because
of their failure to incur a financial obligation. The enrollment contract obliged the parent and
grandparent "to seek funding from the district and to cooperate fully with ... their counsel and the
[private school] . . [and if they] are denied payment by a final unappealable decision resolving their
claim for prospective payment of tuition, they will remain responsible for tuition costs per the
Enrollment Agreement and will complete a new payment schedule." Appeal No. 09-104 (N.Y. State
Review Office, November 24, 2009), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-
104.pdf. The SRO held that "there is no evidence contained in the hearing record indicating that the
[private school] has ever sought payment of the student's tuition for the 2008-2009 school year from the
parent or the students' grandmother, or that it has any intention of doing so." Id. at 10 (citations
omitted). Consequently, the SRO concluded that reimbursement was not warranted. Id. Cf., S.W. v.
N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), where the SRO held that the "language
in the enrollment contract [wa]s unambiguous, and it plainly relieved S.W. of responsibility for the cost
of her son's tuition. Item 4 provide[d] explicitly that Bay Ridge 'has assumed the risk that the parent
may not receive prospective payment from the DOE or that said payment will be delayed beyond the
term of the 2005-2006 school year."' Id
84 S. W., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 357 (quotations omitted) (interpreting an Agreement to Cooperate and
finding it was unambiguous). See, e.g., South Road Assocs., LLC v. Intem'l Bus. Machines Corp., 826
N.E.2d 806, 838 (N.Y. 2005) (determining a contract between a landlord and tenant was unambiguous).
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manifested intention at the time the contract was made. 85 The parties'
manifested intention should be ascertained objectively, and a court should
only "consider[] what a reasonable person in the parties' position would
conclude given the surrounding circumstances."8 6 Parents maintain that a
reasonable person would understand that parents and schools were
intending to enter into a binding contract. From this rationale, parents
conclude that a finding that these contracts are unenforceable is flawed,
since "the law accords to individuals an intention that corresponds with the
reasonable meaning of their words and conduct, and if their words and
conduct manifest an intention to enter into a contract, their real but
unexpressed intention is irrelevant."8 7
This discussion reveals that under the current statutory scheme, parents
that are financially able to pay out-of-pocket expenses or incur a true
financial obligation can take full advantage of the reimbursement remedy
provided by the reimbursement provision, while low-income parents are
precluded from doing so merely because of their financial status. 88 Denial
of tuition payments not only fails to provide a child with an appropriate
education at public expense, as required by FAPE,89 but it also discourages
private schools from accepting disabled children that cannot afford to pay
tuition in advance. As a result, low-income disabled children are precluded
from receiving appropriate educations when an LEA fails to provide the
child with an appropriate education in public school. Given that the
reimbursement provision was intended to ensure that all children receive an
appropriate education, it should be amended to ensure that low-income
parents are not precluded from such relief.
85 See I WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:5 (stating that when a court determines whether parties
intended to be bound by the contract, "a court must consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the parties at the time they manifest an intention to contract") (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted); see also Matthew D. Walden, Could Fair Use Equal Breach of Contract?: An Analysis of
Informational Web Site User Agreements and Their Restrictive Copyright Provisions, 58 WASH & LEE
L. REv. 1625, 1630-31 (2001) (stating " [m]utual assent is a prerequisite to an enforceable contract...
each party must manifest its assent to the terms of a contract before such contract is valid").
86 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:5 (footnotes omitted).
87 Id (footnotes omitted).
88 See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 200 (indicating that in order to seek
reimbursement, parents are required to "pay for the [private] placement and all related expenses up
front"); OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra note 37, at 173, 183 (asserting that compensatory services under the
appropriate relief provision, and not tuition payment under the reimbursement provision, are available
to "parents who cannot financially obtain private services up front").
89 § 1401(9).
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III. ACHIEVING EQUALITY UNDER THE IDEA: AMENDING THE
REIMBURSEMENT PROVISION TO FULFILL THE IDEA's PURPOSE
The IDEA was created to ensure that all disabled children receive a free
appropriate public education (FAPE).90 To fulfill this purpose, Congress
provided appropriate relief and reimbursement to remedy a local
educational agency's (LEA) failure to provide a child with a FAPE.
Although most parents seek tuition payments under the reimbursement
provision after they unilaterally place their child in public school, financial
realities can prevent a parent from incurring a valid debt to a private
school, therefore foreclosing the remedy of reimbursement as the statute is
currently written. However, because the IDEA intended to provide a "full
educational opportunity to all children with disabilities," 91 low-income
children should not be denied the remedy of unilateral placement merely
because their parents cannot afford costly private school tuition. Congress
should amend the reimbursement provision to reflect that intention.
A. The IDEA's Purpose Supports Direct Tuition Payments
Awarding tuition payments to low-income parents is necessary for
fulfilling the IDEA's purpose. When Congress enacted the IDEA, it was
largely concerned with a disabled child's ability to access a free appropriate
education.92 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, disabled children in
over 28 states sought access to public education.93 Judges in most of these
states found that the denial of that access to disabled children violated the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 94 Largely in response to this litigation,
Congress enacted comprehensive legislation to ensure that "all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment,
90 See § 1400(d)(1)(A); 150 Cong. Rec. Sl1543-01 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy that the IDEA requires that "all children in America - including those with disabilities have -
the right to a free and appropriate education").
91 § 1412(a)(2) (emphasis added).
92 See § 1400(d)(1)(A) (the IDEA was enacted "to ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public education") (emphasis added); see also Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (noting "[c]ongress sought primarily to identify and evaluate
handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free public education."); Mills v. Bd. of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
93 See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 121.
94 See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER THE LAW 138 (St. Martins Press
1986).
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and independent living." 95 When a child has been denied that opportunity,
unilateral placement is available to remedy that denial. 96 In Burlington, the
Supreme Court held that if payment for unilateral placement was not
contained in the IDEA,
the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parents'
right to participate fully in developing the proper IEP, and all of the
procedural safeguards would not be complete. Because Congress
undoubtedly did not intend this result, we are confident that by
empowering the court to grant appropriate relief Congress meant to
include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy
in a proper case.97
The Court restated this position in Carter, where it expanded the
appropriate relief provision to apply when the parent's unilateral placement
does not comply with the IDEA's FAPE requirements as described in §
1401 (a)(1 8).98 The Court stated that "the IDEA was intended to ensure that
children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and
free. To read the provisions of § 1401(a)(18) to bar reimbursement in the
circumstances of this case would defeat this statutory purpose." 99
In its most recent decision addressing reimbursement under the IDEA,
the Supreme Court held that if the IDEA did not permit parents that
properly placed their child in private school to receive payment for that
placement, then school districts would be virtually immunized from
discovering whether a child needed special-education services in the first
place.100 The Court held that this interpretation "border[ed] on the
irrational,"1l much like the case of a low-income disabled student. If
tuition payments are not available to such students, and the LEA is aware
of the child's inability to pay private school tuition, then the LEA will
likewise have little or no incentive to provide that child with an appropriate
education. Consequently, low-income parents are effectively precluded
from the remedy of unilateral placement. Although the parent can seek an
95 § 1400(d). See SALOMONE, supra note 94, at 145 (discussing the development of "right to
education" cases and their eventual production of the EAHCA).
96 Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985) (noting that the
provisions of the IDEA "would not always produce a consensus between the school officials and the
parents" so Congress provided for various "'procedural safeguards' to insure the full participation of the
parents and proper resolution of substantive disagreements").
97 Id. at 370.
98 Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993).
99 Id at 13-14.
100 Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009).
101 Id.
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alteration of the child's IEP and compensatory services, those remedies do
not immediately provide the child with an appropriate education.102
Private schools that currently accept disabled children without requiring
advance payment do so because the parents' likelihood of success on the
merits of their child's case is very high, and therefore, these schools are
confident that the parents will succeed during the administrative review
process.103 If the prospect of receiving tuition payments in such cases is no
longer available, it is likely that private schools will not enroll disabled
children from low-income households because the schools will be unable
and unwilling to educate the children for free.104 Alternatively, a private
school that still wishes to admit low-income, disabled children, but that is
not willing to risk nonpayment by LEAs, will likely increase its regular
tuition, thereby charging wealthier students more than necessary in order to
educate the low-income disabled children. Since the IDEA intended for
appropriate education to be provided by LEAs, and not by private schools
or wealthy parents of private school students, the LEAs should be required
to pay for private school tuitions where a parent has succeeded in proving
Burlington's three prongs.
If low-income families are denied the remedy of unilateral placements,
they will also lose considerable bargaining power during the development
of their child's IEP. The IDEA gives parents "more control over the
education of their children than almost every other parent in the nation's
public schools, through an elaborate planning and review process." 05
However, where parents cannot use unilateral placement as leverage to
secure appropriate services, LEAs likely are less motivated to create the
best IEP for the child. Although "parents are assigned a substantial role in
decision making, aptly characterized as 'significant bargaining power,'
through the IEP,"106 that bargaining power is drastically reduced when
102 Since the appeals process is lengthy, a decision finding that an LEP is inappropriate and
requiring changes to the IEP or compensatory services would likely come after a child has received
months of an inappropriate education in public school. Indeed, there are several notification and timing
requirements under the IDEA for the administrative process. See supra note 11.
103 This is evidenced by a private school's willingness to sign an Agreement to Cooperate with a
parent. See supra notes 66 and 74 and accompanying text; see also Application of a Student with a
Disability, Appeal No. 09-104, at 9-10 (N.Y. State Review Office, November 25, 2009), available at
http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-104.
104 In a 2004 report cataloguing information from the 1999-2000 school year, the Special
Education Expenditure Project listed the average per-pupil expenditure for a disabled child in private
school to be $26,440. See Jay G. Chambers et al., Special Education Expenditure Project: What Are We
Spending on Special Education Services in the United States, 1999-2000, at 12 (2004), available at
http://csef.air.org/publications/seep/national/AdvRptl .pdf.
105 Stephen A. Rosenbaum, When It's Not Apparent: Some Modest Advice to Parent Advocates for
Students with Disabilities, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUv. L. & POL'Y 159, 161-62 (2001).
106 Id at 165.
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LEAs do not face the potential payment of private school tuition. Because
the IDEA intended to provide parents with significant influence in the
education of their children,107 the remedial provisions of the IDEA should
not be interpreted as reducing that role.10 8
Finally, eliminating tuition payment to low-income parents would
require those parents to seek either compensatory services or alteration of
the child's inappropriate IEP. However, these remedies are grossly
inadequate when compared to the remedy of unilateral placement.
Compensatory services merely make up for past inappropriate services, and
they do not provide an appropriate education to the child at the time it is
needed.109 A child is similarly denied an immediate appropriate education
when a parent must seek an alteration of an IEP through the administrative
process.110 Where a child is faced with either receiving an inappropriate
education in public school or an appropriate one in private school, the
IDEA and the Supreme Court have recognized a parent's right to place the
child in private school so that he may receive an appropriate education.'I'
While a parent may decide to seek compensatory services instead of
unilateral placement, compensatory services should not be the only remedy
available to low-income parents.112 Because the IDEA was created to
107 See ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 120 (discussing a parent's role in the IEP
development process); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (2011) (including parents on the team that
creates their child's IEP).
108 See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (finding unilateral
placement available because without that remedy "the parents' right to participate fully in developing
the IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete").
109 See Bd. of Educ. v. Munoz, 16 A.D.3d 1142, 1144 (N.Y. 2005); see also 8 NYCRR § 201.10
(2011) (enabling the student to continue to participate in the general education curriculum, although in
another setting, and to progress toward meeting the goals set out in that IEP).
110 § 1412(c) provides procedural safeguards to remedy inappropriate IEPs, but it also allows up to
120 days, or 4 months, before requiring an IHO decision to be rendered on that IEP's appropriateness.
II See § 1412(a)(10)(C) (authorizing reimbursement to the parents of a disabled child, who
previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency); s-ee
also Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 367 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2006) (explaining that this authority
comes from the plain language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)).
112 In discussing the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, Senator Harkin explicitly said that
"compensatory education must . . . belatedly provide all education and related services previously
denied and needed to make the child whole. Children whose parents can't afford to pay for special
education and related services when school districts fail to provide FAPE should be treated the same as
children whose parents can. Children whose parents have the funds can be fully reimbursed under the
Supreme Courts decisions in Burlington and [Carter], subject to certain equitable considerations, and
children whose parents lack the funds should not be treated differently." 150 Cong. Rec. S 11547 (daily
ed. November 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Harkin). Although this language could be interpreted as
providing only the remedy of compensatory services to low-income parents, in light of the statutory
purpose of the IDEA, Senator Harkin's remarks are more accurately read to require equal remedies for
both low-income and high-income families in light of the Supreme Court's continuous holding that a
free and appropriate education for all children is mandated by the IDEA. See, e.g., Florence County
Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993), a case in which the Supreme Court said that the
intention behind IDEA is to ensure that children with disabilities get a free and appropriate education.
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benefit all disabled children, the remedial provisions of the Act should not
be interpreted as applying to a wealthy disabled child, but not to a poor
disabled child.
B. Precluding Low-Income Parents From the Unilateral Placement
Remedy Violates the Constitution's Guarantee ofEqual Protection
A complete denial of tuition payments to low-income parents under the
IDEA arguably violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution because it prevents access to an appropriate education to one
class of individuals while providing that access to another class. 113 The
Equal Protection Clause prohibits the federal and state governments from
unreasonably classifying individuals and treating them differently based
upon that classification.1 14 When the reimbursement provision is
interpreted as denying tuition payments to parents based on their inability
to incur a financial obligation to pay tuition, disabled children from low-
income families are treated differently than disabled children from wealthy
families. The Supreme Court has established that neither denial of
education nor disparate treatment based on wealth triggers strict or
heightened scrutiny. However, unequal application of the reimbursement
provision violates a poor disabled child's equal protection rights, because
there is no necessary or rational relation between this unequal application
and a compelling or legitimate government interest.
The Supreme Court has recognized in one narrow instance that education
is deserving of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 115 In
Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that a Texas statute that deprived children of
113 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1; see also SALOMONE, supra note 94, at 139 (explaining that the
courts in PARC (Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972)) and Mills
(Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)) used a rational basis test to evaluate the
plaintiffs claims, finding that "[t]he denial of educational services was not reasonably related to any
legitimate governmental interest, not even the avoidance of undue financial burdens").
114 ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 11 (noting that "[i]n its evaluation of what is meant
by equal terms, the Supreme Court has traditionally applied different degrees of scrutiny to the practices
of governmental entities"); EDWARD SIDLOW & BETH HENSCHEN, AMERICA AT ODDS: ALTERNATE
ADDITION 99 (Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 6th ed. 2009) (stating that "[t]he equal protection clause
has been interpreted by the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, to mean that states must treat all
persons in an equal manner and may not discriminate unreasonably against a particular group or class
of individuals unless there is a sufficient reason to do so").
115 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that students
who are being excluded from public schools because of their parents illegal immigration status are
innocent victims and therefore such classifications deserve to be reviewed with heightened scrutiny
under the equal protection clause); see also Anja Matwijkiw & Willie Mack, Making Sense of the Right
to Truth in Educational Ethics: Toward a Theory and Practice that Protect the Fundamental Interests
ofAdolescent Students, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 329, 339 (2007) (discussing that the
court in Plyler applied intermediate scrutiny, a stricter standard than usual, and stressed the importance
of education for children).
2011] 895
JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:4
illegal immigrants from attending public school violated the Equal
Protection Clause because "[t]he inestimable toll of that deprivation on the
social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the
individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it
most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status based denial
of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause."116 The Court did not hold that education was a
fundamental right, but it did find that the "denial of education to some
isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting
unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit."11 7
Since the Plyler decision, the Court has not "extended [the Plyler] holding
beyond the unique circumstances that provoked its unique confluence of
theories and rationales."s18 Since the situation created by an unequal
application of the reimbursement provision is not analogous to the one in
Plyler, where Texas was attempting to "control the conduct of adults by
acting against their children,"119 heightened scrutiny is not warranted under
the Plyler rationale.120
The Court has also held that strict scrutiny is appropriate in limited
circumstances where the government classifies on the basis of wealth. 121
Even in such instances, strict scrutiny is only appropriate where "the class
discriminated against ... share[s] two distinguishing characteristics:
because of their impecunity they were unable to pay for some desired
benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit."l 22 In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that
strict scrutiny was not the appropriate test for evaluating whether unequal
116 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
117 Id. at 221-22.
118 Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (quotations and citations
omitted).
119 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell describes this aspect of the
case as one of the "unique circumstances" in which "the Court may properly require that the State's
interests be substantial and the means bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to these interests." Id. at 239
(Powell, J., concurring).
120 See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 461-62 (holding that since the circumstances were not similar to
those presented by Plyler, heightened scrutiny was not warranted).
121 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1973) (discussing the
Court's past equal protection decisions regarding individuals inability "to pay for some desired
benefit"); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (stating that unless a group claiming discrimination on
the basis of poverty can show that it is "completely unable to pay for some desired benefit," strict
scrutiny of a classification based on wealth would not apply).
122 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20.
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funding for schools violated the Equal Protection Clause, because such
disparate funding did "not occasion[] an absolute deprivation of the desired
benefit,"l 23 namely, education. The Court also held, as in Plyler, that
education was not a fundamental right requiring heightened scrutiny. 124
Thus, the Court applied a rational basis test and concluded that Texas's
taxation scheme was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 125
Here, unlike in Rodriguez, precluding low-income parents from
unilaterally placing their child in private school does create "an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit,"l 26 because the disabled child will not
receive any educational benefit when he has been denied a FAPE in public
school and cannot be unilaterally placed in private school.127 The Supreme
Court has defined "appropriate education" under the IDEA to mean special
education and related services that provide the disabled child with "some
educational benefit."1 28 That "educational benefit" does not have to
"maximize the potential of the handicapped child[],"129 but must merely
ensure that the disabled child is "benefiting educationally." 30 Thus, if a
child is denied an appropriate education and cannot receive immediate
redress of that denial, he will receive no educational benefit at all during
that time and consequently suffer "an absolute deprivation of the desired
benefit."'31 It follows, then, that strict scrutiny is appropriate; to pass
constitutional muster, a school district that refuses to pay a child's private
school tuition, only because her parents are too poor to incur a financial
obligation to pay such tuition, must demonstrate that this disparate
treatment is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. The state
interest allegedly being protected is the cost of special education. This
interest is not a compelling one in light of the important role that education
plays in our society. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court stated that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments" because "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
123 Id. at 23.
124 Id at 35 ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
125 Id. at 54-55 ("[W]here wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require
absolute equality or precise equal advantage.").
126 Id. at 23.
127 Bd. of Ed. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982)
(defining "appropriate" narrowly).
128 Id. at 188-89.
129 Id. at 189-90.
130 Id. at 203.
131 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23. Although the IDEA provides compensatory services and revision of
an inappropriate IEP as additional remedies for the denial of a FAPE, those remedies fail to provide a
low-income student with an immediate, appropriate education.
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expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms."1 32 Although Brown
addressed racial discrimination in public schools, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of education in other decisions.133 For
example, in Plyler, the Court dismissed the idea that education was "merely
some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation." 34 While the Court stopped short of recognizing
education as a fundamental right, it emphasized "the importance of
education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child."l35 Because of this importance, "the
interest in educating the [disabled] children clearly must outweigh [the
government's] interest in preserving its financial resources."l 36 In this
situation, mere "avoidance of undue financial burdens"137 is not a
compelling governmental interest. 138
Not only does the unequal application of the reimbursement provision
not satisfy strict scrutiny, but it also does not satisfy the lesser rational basis
standard.139 Under rational basis review, the provision must only be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.140 The legitimate
government interest arguably being addressed by the unequal application of
132 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
133 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (indicating the importance of education); see also
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30 (recognizing "that the grave significance of education both to the individual
and to our society cannot be doubted") (quotations and footnotes omitted).
134 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
135 Id.
136 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
137 SALOMONE, supra note 94, at 139.
138 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (stating "Texas
virtually concedes that its historically rooted dual system of financing education could not withstand the
strict judicial scrutiny this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere
with fundamental constitutional rights or suspect classifications.") (footnotes omitted).
139 The Supreme Court's precedents treating poverty as a suspect classification warranting strict
scrutiny have been narrowly focused on denials of access to fair criminal proceedings. See James A.
Kushner, Government Discrimination: Equal Protection Law and Litigation, WL Gov. DISCRIM. § 1:5
(2010). Additionally, it is difficult to demonstrate that low-income parents negatively affected by a
narrow application of the reimbursement provision are completely unable to pay for private school
education, and that the denial of that remedy results in the absolute derivation of the benefit, as required
by the Court's jurisprudence. Thus, courts may be more likely to apply a rational basis test unless and
until the Supreme Court holds this situation warrants application of strict scrutiny.
140 See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (holding
"[u]nder traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained, if the
classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest."); United States v.
Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (stating "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.").
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the unilateral placement remedy is the substantial cost of special education
and of unilateral placement in particular.141 LEAs argue that limiting the
unilateral placement remedy to those that can afford to pay tuition in
advance is a rationally related means of controlling this cost. However, the
government's interest in reducing the cost of special education can only be
a legitimate government interest when that interest does not preclude
disabled children from receiving an appropriate education.142 As discussed
above, low-income disabled children are precluded from receiving such
education under the current reimbursement provision.143 While the
reduction of educational costs may be a concern of state legislatures, it
cannot be deemed legitimate when it comes at the expense of precluding
disabled children from receiving an appropriate education.
Additionally, limiting the unilateral placement remedy to parents that
can afford to pay tuition is not rationally related to reducing the cost of
special education. The Supreme Court, in both Carter and Forest Grove,
dismissed concerns that their holdings would increase the cost of special
education.144 In Carter, the Court recognized that "Congress has imposed a
significant financial burden on States and school districts that participate in
the IDEA,"l45 but that "[parents] are entitled to reimbursement only if a
federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and
the private school placement was proper under the Act."' 46 In Forest
Grove, the Court concluded that concerns of "a substantial financial burden
on public school districts" 47 were "unfounded," 48 even though permitting
141 Educating a disabled child in public school costs an average of $12,639 per year. See U.S.
Dep't of Educ., 1999-2000 President's Commission on Excellence in Special Education Report,
available at http://www2.ed.gov/inits/commissionsboards/whspecialeducation/reports/three.html. When
a disabled child is unilaterally placed in private school and the LEA is ordered to pay for that
placement, the cost can be more than twice as much as a private school tuition of $26,350 . See, e.g.,
S.W. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Chambers, supra
note 104, at 18. Indeed, the tuition can sometimes be more than twice as much (Winston Prep lists its
tuition at the New York City location as $46,800); see Winston Prep Application, supra note 10.
142 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40 (stating that it is not the Court's role to "condemn the
State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply
revenues for local interests," which the Court determined was "an area in which it has traditionally
deferred to state legislatures"); Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 508-09 (1937) (noting
that a state has the inherent power to tax and grant exemptions).
143 See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
144 See Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009) Forest Grove Sch. Dist.,
129 (holding that the Act will not impose a substantial financial burden on school districts); see also
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (stating that claims of an unreasonable
financial burden are irrational).
145 Carter, 510 U.S. at 15.
146 Id.
147 Forest Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 2496.
148 Id.
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tuition payments under the appropriate relief provision when a child had
not been offered special education services prior to his private school
placement created a remedy for a class of individuals not captured by the
reimbursement provision. Both the Forest Grove and Carter Courts
reasoned that the burden placed on parents to demonstrate that their
placement was appropriate, while the LEA's was not, is a significant
limitation on unilateral placement, and that further curtailment of this
remedy is unnecessary and does not serve to reduce costs. 149
Any fears that LEAs have regarding an increase in special education cost
resulting from allowing low-income parents to receive direct tuition
payments under the IDEA are likewise unfounded. First, these low-income
parents must succeed on the merits of their case, as did the parents in
Carter and Forest Grove. This burden is no less difficult, and may indeed
prove even more difficult, in the case of a low-income parent. In Schaffer
v. Weast, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in an administrative
hearing under the IDEA has the burden of proving her case. 150 Generally,
the plaintiff in such a hearing is the parent. Additionally, in Arlington
Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, the Court held that
parents could not recover non-attorney expert witness fees even if they
succeeded on the merits of their case. 151 Therefore, not only must parents
sustain the burden of proof at an administrative hearing, but they must also
rely on their own funds if they require an expert witness to help them
sustain that burden. As the Court has recognized, these substantial hurdles
ensure that only the truly deserving will be awarded tuition payments.
Furthermore, "the facts show that there is very little litigation under the
IDEA,"152 and that "the incidence of private school placement at public
expense is quite small." 53 Although at least one study has shown that "the
number of court decisions concerning special education has increased,"1 54
that study also recognized that "the percentage of rulings in favor of the
149 Id (noting that "the incidence of private-school placement at public expense is quite small").
150 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (holding that "the ordinary default rule is that
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims").
151 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297 (2006) (stating that
prevailing litigants in an IDEA action are not entitled to recovery of fees for experts' services).
152 150 Cong. Rec. S11543-01 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
153 Forest Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 2496. See Allan G. Osborne & Charles J. Russo, Commentary:
Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 250 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 16 (2009) ("The net result of Forest Grove.
. . is likely something of a wash in terms of its financial impact."); see also Thomas A. Mayes & Perry
Zirkel, Special Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL &
SPEC. EDUC. 350, 351 (2001) (stating "[a]pproximately 2% of IDEA-eligible children receive their
education in private settings.").
154 Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition Reimbursement for Special Education Students, 7 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 122, 123 (Winter 1997).
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parents has not changed significantly since the 1975 inception of [the
IDEA]."155 In a follow-up study, researchers found that:
a statistically significant change in the outcome distribution of
published tuition reimbursement decisions has not followed in
the wake of successive announcements of new pertinent legal
doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court and ... Congress. This
finding, which is in line with [the previous study's] results,
should douse the rhetorical fires of those who assert that changes
in the law concerning tuition reimbursement constitute either
unjustified windfalls to parents of children with disabilities or
broad attacks on the right to a FAPE that the IDEA provides.156
Despite the fact that this follow-up study did recognize that "increased
frequency of tuition reimbursement claims" can cause financial strain on an
LEA,157 allowing low-income parents to seek direct tuition payments will
not cause droves of parents to unilaterally place their children in private
schools and file direct tuition payment claims. Given the high burden of
proof as discussed above, as well as private schools' own admission
policies. private schools are not in the business of educating children for
free. Those that admit disabled students without requiring payment in
advance will do so only where they are confident that the parent will
succeed on the merits of the case. Thus, while some parents may wish to
unilaterally place their children in private school and seek direct tuition
payments, the children must first be accepted for admission.
Moreover, while LEAs argue that denying tuition payments under the
IDEA is a rational method of reducing education costs, this method is not
rational when compared to the truly cost-saving measure of providing
disabled children with an appropriate education in public school.158 If an
LEA implements the latter measure, it will not have to pay for the child's
private school education. The Court in Carter explained that the IDEA's
mandate requires that "public education authorities who want to avoid
reimbursing parents for private education of a disabled child can do one of
two things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a public
setting, or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's
choice ... [and the] school officials who conform to it need not worry
155 Id. This study also found that "the Burlington and Carter cases have not made courts more
inclined to rule in favor of parents." Id. at 124.
156 Maynes & Zirkel, supra note 153, at 357.
157 Id.
158 See supra note 141 (listing the difference between public and private educations as roughly
$34,000).
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about reimbursement claims." 159 Thus, reduction in the cost of unilateral
placement is directly related to the LEA's provision of a FAPE to its
disabled students, and not to denying tuition payments to meritorious
parents.160 Finally, allowing direct tuition payments would not increase the
cost of special education, because courts and IHOs have the discretion to
determine "the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that
should be [awarded]."161 Although unilateral placement imposes a financial
burden on LEAs, limiting that relief to wealthy individuals does not reduce
that burden, and therefore is not rationally related to decreasing special
education costs.
C. Proposed Amendment
In order to remedy the inequality created by the current statute and bring
the reimbursement provision in line with the IDEA's purpose, the term
"reimbursement" in the provision 62 should be replaced as follows, with the
new language in italics:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously
received special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private
elementary school or secondary school without the consent of
or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer
may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of
that enrollment or pay to the parents the cost of the enrollment
as stated in an enrollment agreement if the court or hearing
officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate
public education available to the child in a timely manner prior
to that enrollment.
This amendment communicates that every parent is entitled to
unilaterally place their child in private school and receive payment for that
placement if a court or IHO finds that the placement was proper. Although
this amendment would broaden the language of the statute, it would not
expand the relief that Congress intended to provide through the
reimbursement provision - specifically, that all children receive a FAPE.
Unilateral placements present one of the most significant costs that LEAs
must absorb under the IDEA. Amending the reimbursement provision to
159 Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
160 Id; see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985).
161 Florence, 510 U.S. at 15.
162 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2011).
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allow for payment of tuition in all circumstances where a FAPE has been
denied, and the parents have properly placed their child in private school,
will likely not significantly increase the frequency of placements or their
cost.163 Parents that unilaterally place their child in private school must still
prove that the LEA's placement was inappropriate, the private school
placement was appropriate, and the equities favor payment of tuition. 164
This is a high burden, and therefore, relatively few parents will succeed. 165
Moreover, the child in question still needs to be accepted into the private
school, and a school that does not believe a child has a meritorious case
will likely not enroll that child for fear of not receiving tuition payments.
Additionally, this amendment will allow and encourage parents and
schools to enter into accurate contracts, a result that parties, courts, and
Congress should desire. Under the current reimbursement provision, low-
income parents demonstrate a financial obligation by entering into an
enrollment contract that requires them to pay the school's tuition.
Although these contracts are arguably valid, since low-income parents are
incapable of fulfilling their part of the contract without payment from the
LEA, and since private schools are aware of the parents' financial inability
to pay when the parties form the contract, assertions that these contracts
accurately reflect the parties' agreement are disingenuous. 166 Also,
allowing these contracts to act as evidence of a financial obligation
warranting reimbursement undermines the legitimacy of the judicial
system, because it puts parents and schools in the unenviable position of
having to mislead or lie to a judge or hearing officer about their intentions
in entering the contract. 167 If a party to an Agreement to Pay or Agreement
to Cooperate and Pay admits that neither party to their contract intended it
to be enforceable if payment was denied by the IHO, the parent would
163 See supra notes 150-61.
164 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (holding that in a case where a court determines that a private
placement desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an [EP calling for placement in a
public school was inappropriate, the appropriate relief would include a prospective injunction directing
the school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing the child in a private
school); see also Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp 860, 869 (D.N.H. 1992) (stating
the same rule followed by the court).
165 See Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009) (noting that parents are
entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated
IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the Act); see also Florence, 510 U.S. at 15.
166 See discussion supra notes 63-65.
167 When these contracts are litigated, parties are asked about the accuracy of the contract and
whether the parent truly had an intention to pay the tuition as required by the contract. Thus, a party
must either lie and tell the court she intends to pay, or admit the invalidity of the contract. See, e.g.,
Application of a Child with a Disability, No. 09-079 at 11 (N.Y. State Review Office, September 14,
2009). This shows a parent's testimony regarding her view of her obligations under the enrollment
contract. Id.
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likely be denied tuition payment under the reimbursement provision since
the court would find that the parent did not incur a financial obligation. In
such a situation, parties and private school representatives are tempted to
lie under oath because doing so increases the likelihood that payment will
be awarded.168
The direct payment provision will allow parties and private schools to
enter into enrollment contracts that accurately reflect their agreement.
Private schools are not generally in the business of educating children for
free, so these schools will likely continue to require financially capable
parents to pay tuition in advance, or enter into binding enrollment contracts
for tuition, in order to reduce the risk of a parent refusing to pay tuition if
she loses on the merits of her case at the administrative hearing. Even
though this amendment may fall short of statutory perfection, it at least
ensures that the unilateral placement remedy is available to all disabled
students, thereby allowing them to receive a FAPE.
IV. AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION: COURTS AND IHOS HAVE THE AUTHORITY
UNDER THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF PROVISION TO AWARD DIRECT TUITION
PAYMENTS
Due to the extreme inequities that result from an application of the
current reimbursement provision, the IDEA should be amended. However,
amendments to federal statutes do not happen overnight, and in the
meantime, many low-income disabled students will be denied a FAPE.
Because the IDEA provides courts and IHOs with "broad discretion" 69 to
"grant such relief as [they] determine[] is appropriate" 70 "in light of the
purpose of the Act,"17 those decision-makers should award direct tuition
payments to parents under the IDEA's appropriate relief provision. This
relief is warranted because of "the breadth of the authority conferred by
[the appropriate relief provision], the interest in providing relief consistent
with the [IDEA's] purpose, and the injustice that a contrary reading would
produce."1 72
168 See, e.g., Application of a Child with a Disability, No. 08-050, at 10 (N.Y. State Review Office,
July 23, 2008), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-050.pdf (finding that the
parties did not intend to be obligated by the contract despite the principal of private school's testimony
that the school assumed that the mother would pay the tuition if the school district did not).
169 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
170 § 1415(i)(2)(C).
171 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
172 Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2494, n. 10 (2009); see Florence County
Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12-14 (1993); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70.
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The Supreme Court's jurisprudence interpreting the appropriate relief
provision demonstrates that a court or IHO has the authority under the
appropriate relief provision to award payment of a private school's
tuition. 173 In Burlington, the Court declared that "the ordinary meaning of
["appropriate relief"] confers broad discretion on the court. The type of
relief is not further specified, except that it must be 'appropriate.' Absent
other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be
'appropriate' in light of the purpose of the Act."174 The Court relied on this
breadth of authority to authorize tuition payments, even where other
provisions of the IDEA seemed to foreclose a remedy. 175 In Carter, the
Court found that tuition payments were appropriate relief even though the
private school did not "meet the standards of the State educational
agency"1 76 as required to establish a FAPE under the IDEA. The Court
held that to read the FAPE "requirements as applying to parental
placements would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal
recognized in Burlington."177 Similarly, in Forest Grove, the Court held
that the appropriate relief provision provided a remedy to a parent that
unilaterally placed her child in private school, even though the child did not
"previously receive[] special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency" prior to enrollment in private school, as
required by the IDEA. 178 The Court held that the reimbursement provision
"does not foreclose reimbursement awards in other circumstances"1 79 not
specifically addressed by that provision.180 The "other circumstance"
facing the disabled child in Forest Grove was that he never received special
education services in public school before he was unilaterally placed in
private school. Consequently, although the reimbursement provision did
not apply to the circumstances, the appropriate relief provision's "broad
discretion" 81 enabled the Court to award tuition payments because the
relief sought by T.A.'s parents was "appropriate . . . in light of the Act's
173 See Forest Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 2492; Florence, 510 U.S. at 16; Burlington, 417 U.S. at 369;
Mr. A. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 09 Civ. 5097 (PGG), 2011 WL 321137 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 1,
2011).
174 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
175 Id. See Florence, 510 U.S. at 14.
176 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B) (2011). See Florence, 510 U.S. at 14.
177 Florence, 510 U.S. at 7, 13.
178 § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
179 Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2493 (2009).
180 Id. at 2448 (holding that 1997 Amendments do not "categorically prohibit reimbursement for
private-education costs if a child has not 'previously received special education and related services
under the authority of a public agency"') (quoting § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).
181 Id. at 2490 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)).
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broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE."182
In Billy's situation, the "other circumstance" is his inability to incur a
financial obligation warranting reimbursement. Similar to T.A., Billy falls
outside the reimbursement provision, because the provision only captures a
situation in which a parent is capable of paying a private school's tuition.
And since the reimbursement provision "bars reimbursement only when a
school district makes a FAPE available by correctly identifying a child as
having a disability and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child's
needs," 83 where an LEA fails to do so, and the reimbursement provision
does not encompass the situation presented, a court or H10 has the
discretion to award appropriate relief consistent with the IDEA's
purpose. 184
Direct tuition payments are appropriate because they require LEAs to
"belatedly pay expenses that [they] should have paid all along and would
have borne in the first instance had [they] developed a proper IEP."185 The
Court in Burlington stated that "it seems clear beyond cavil that
'appropriate' relief would include a prospective injunction directing the
school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing
the child in a private school." 86 This "prospective injunction" is all that
Billy's parents are seeking. However, because "the review process is
ponderous,"l87 they have had to wait many months into the school year to
receive their prospective relief. Given the passage of time, an injunction
would not remedy Billy's injury; whereas payment of the private school
tuition would. 188
Although the Supreme Court has stressed that parents who unilaterally
place their child in private school do so "at their own financial risk," 89
Billy's parents' failure to incur such a risk does not make direct tuition
payments inappropriate. For some parents, incurring such a risk is
impossible, but would still foreclose the unilateral placement remedy. This
182 Id. at 2490-9 1.
183 Id at 2493 (emphasis added).
184 Id. at 2496 (explaining that "IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private special-
education services when a school district fails to provide FAPE"). See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v.
Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (holding that the Court has broad discretion in determining
relief for IDEA violations).
185 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71.
186 Id. at 370.
187 Id
188 When tuition payments are provide by the LEA, the unilaterally placed child receives an
appropriate education at public expense. It is not until the LEA assumes payment of the private school
tuition that the child receives a FAPE and the LEA has fulfilled its obligation under the IDEA. The
payment by the LEA completes the requirement that the education be a public one.
189 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374.
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result is inapposite to the Court's consistent iteration that the IDEA "was
intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate education and a
free one; it should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those
objectives."190 Precluding low-income parents from receiving direct tuition
payments would defeat the IDEA's hallmark objective. 191 Direct tuition
payments that provide a free appropriate public education are
"'appropriate' in light of the purpose of the Act,"192 and should be awarded
where a parent has not incurred a financial obligation to pay tuition.
CONCLUSION
Under either solution proposed above, Billy would be able to receive an
appropriate education for his fourth grade year, as Academy B would
accept Billy, confident that his parents would be awarded tuition payments
if they succeeded on the merits of Billy's case. Anna's parents would also
be able to receive an appropriate remedy from the LEA (as she had in her
third grade year), since, under the revised amendment, she would still be
entitled to payment of the private school tuition. This resolution reflects
the IDEA's purpose and produces an equitable result. Thus, Congress
should amend the reimbursement provision to ensure that all disabled
students, regardless of their financial status, can receive a free appropriate
public education. Until Congress enacts such an amendment, however,
courts and 1HOs should award direct tuition payments to parents that have
not paid out-of-pocket expenses or incurred a financial obligation.
190 Id. at 372. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1993) (stating
"IDEA was intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an education that is both
appropriate and free. To read the provisions of [the Act] to bar reimbursement in the circumstances of
this case would defeat this statutory purpose.") (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373) (citation omitted).
191 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2011); see also SALOMONE, supra note 94, at 146 (finding "[t]he
centerpiece of the [IDEA] is a grants-in-aid program authorized under Part B. It requires states to
provide all handicapped children between the ages of three and twenty-one with a 'free, appropriate
education."').
192 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
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